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these he rejects, the third and fifth summarily. The fourth he regards as at least logically tenable and makes something of a plea for it, though pointing out that what we need now is facts and rigid experiments.

(4.) *Encore les chevaux d'Elberfeld*, par M. ED. CLAPARÈDE, avec une note de M. le Dr. J. de Modzelewski, Archives de Psychologie, XIII, 1913, 244-284.

(4.) The first section of this second paper of Claparède's on the Elberfeld horses is devoted to the results of a second visit to Krall's stables, in March of the current year, made in company with Drs. Modzelewski and Weber-Bauler of Geneva. Claparède had, with these gentlemen, opportunity to work with the horses both when Krall was absent from the city and when he was present and actively co-operating. The results obtained were entirely negative; that is, the horses failed to respond correctly in most of the tests, the percentage of right cases, according to tables given in Dr. de Modzelewski's note, running only from 7½ to 13%. In the few tests made "without knowledge" there were also no successes.

The general failure of the horses Krall thought might be due to their shedding their coats—"always a trying time for them" (p. 250); but we learn from a letter cited by Claparède (p. 257) that two of the horses very soon after worked well for another visitor, and again on p. 267 we find this note by Krall upon Claparède's first visit: "Prof. Claparède was here some time ago and obtained no results. . . . The day after the departure of M. Claparède, an elderly and very friendly major came to see the horses. He succeeded in becoming the friend of the animals, and they worked without making errors. . . . You see that everything depends on the visitors, especially if they are, or are not, on good terms (*sympathiques*) with the horses." We fear that this is the handwriting on the wall for Prof. Claparède at Elberfeld and indeed for any visitor who cherishes scientific reserves.

The second section of Claparède's paper is devoted to a convenient critical review of recent literature arranged according to the hypotheses favored—trickery, unconscious signals, telepathy, and independent intelligence of the horses. The third section is a counterblast to the "protestation" issued by opponents of Krall's views among German zoologists and comparative psychologists.

The final section is the note of Dr. de Modzelewski in which he favors a telepathic explanation—or, as he prefers to term it, the suggestion of motor inhibition (*suggestion motrice d'inhibition*)—as against the hypotheses of fraud, unconscious signals, and independent intelligence. This, to the reviewer's mind, is not far from saying that the horses are controlled by signals conveyed in a manner not yet determined.

(5.) *I Cavalli pensanti di Elberfeld*, by Dr. WILLIAM MACKENZIE. Da una Conferenza tenuta al VI Congresso della Società Italiana per il Progresso delle Scienze. Genova, Ottobre, 1912. Estratto della Rivista di Psicologia, Anno VIII, n. 6, 1912. Pp. 43.

(5.) In Dr. Mackenzie's presentation of the case for the independent thinking of the Elberfeld horses the reader who has traversed Krall's own volume will find little that is new, save a few paragraphs with reference to the personality of Krall (pp. 9 ff.) and brief descrip-

tions here and there of experiments, some of later date than Krall's book and others made in the presence of Mackenzie himself, including a few with the blind stallion, Berto (p. 39).

Mackenzie's standpoint is indicated pretty well by the following conjecture which he quotes with approval: "All that lives around us probably lives as we live, and the phenomena of our minds, even those believed to be specific and characteristic, are only a manifestation, different in degree, perhaps, but not different in principle from that of other like phenomena which are revealed to us little by little from remote provinces of universal nature" (p. 7). A somewhat uncritical attitude is, perhaps, betrayed by an occasional loose statement, by the acceptance of at least one very doubtful experiment of Krall's as valid, and especially by the following argument brought forward near the end of the paper (p. 42). Urging that the mathematical performances of the horses ought not to be held improbable because such feats would be difficult or impossible for most human beings, he continues: "But it is not to be forgotten that numberless organisms of the earth and water solve daily mathematical problems just as abstract; I mention only the classical cells of the bee. The supposed circumstance that these organisms neither know nor comprehend what they do, does not seem to me to be the thing precisely which would help our understanding of the enigma." But what sort of a parallel is there here? Is it not contended that the Elberfeld horses are conscious in their arithmetical work? Have they not been taught like human beings and are they not supposed to have grasped the number system? Or if this is not so, and they give their results, as the bee shapes her cell, without knowledge or comprehension of what they are about, what ground have we for crediting them with mathematical intelligence? May we not with equal justification credit them with intelligence in matters of chemistry and physiology because they digest their food?

(6.) *Der Streit um die rechnenden Pferde*, Vortrag, gehalten am 27 Februar, 1913, in der Psychologischen Gesellschaft in München von Dr. MAX ETTLINGER. Mit einem Anhang: Die gemeinsame Protesterklärung auf dem internationalen Zoologenkongress. Verlag Natur und Kultur, München. S. 54.

(6.) If the views of Krall find in Claparède a judge inclined to mercy and in Mackenzie an aggressive champion, they meet in Ettlinger a hostile and experienced critic. Ettlinger is a literary man and magazine editor of Munich, a student and writer of some years' standing in animal psychology, and one of the conservatives in the original Hans controversy.

His critique, to his regret, lacks one important feature—a firsthand study of the horses—but like a number of others of openly critical attitude, he has not been able to secure the chance for such a study under satisfactory conditions. His account of the horses and his estimates of the reliability of the results are therefore drawn of necessity from the printed sources and the personal reports of those who have been in this respect more fortunate than he.

After a brief resumé of the work of Pfungst, he adduces confirmatory evidence from other sources, especially from the practice of professional showmen, and then considers the performances of Krall's horses, giving chief though not exclusive attention to their mathematical feats. Ettlinger's contention is, of course, that Muhamed and Zarif are guided by visual or other signals given consciously or